Phenomenal independence can be understood to be making one of two claims. It might be making the claim that experience presents sounds as independent of material objects, so that experience is veridical only if sounds are independent of material objects. Or it might be making the claim that experience presents sounds without presenting material objects, so that experience is veridical if sounds are independent of material objects and if they are not. According to this second claim, experience doesn’t rule out the possibility that sounds are in fact dependent on material objects. I think those writers who have defended phenomenal independence defend the latter claim. They think that auditory experience is, in a certain sense, non-committal about things other than sounds.

We can hear sounds, and can pick them out demonstratively in experience (‘that barking noise’), and we can hear the sources of sounds and pick them out demonstratively (‘that dog’). So we can pick out and attend to the sources of sounds, as well as the sounds they make. That supports the suggestion that auditory experience presents sounds as available for primitive demonstrative reference (‘phenomenal intimacy’) and any adequate account of auditory perception must be consistent with that suggestion.

Jason argues that phenomenal intimacy is not consistent with phenomenal independence, on the grounds that phenomenal independence entails that sounds are independent of their sources, hence that we hear sound sources in virtue of hearing sounds, and hence that it is impossible to make primitive demonstrative reference to sound sources on the basis of auditory experience.

I suggested that writers who defend phenomenal independence have in mind a view that doesn’t entail that sounds are independent of their sources, but leaves it open whether they are dependent. On this understanding, Jason’s argument doesn’t go through. To show that there is a problem here, he would need to show that phenomenal intimacy requires something more than is provided by experience if phenomenal independence is true. Whether something more is required depends on what is required for primitive demonstrative reference. If primitive demonstrative reference simply rules out explicit deferred demonstrative reference, then it is not obvious that experience as characterised
by phenomenal independence couldn't present sound sources as available for primitive demonstrative reference.

Berkeley thought that the content of perceptual experience is restricted to the sensory and that to go beyond the sensory requires the subject of experience to engage in inferential or associative reasoning. If we accept his restriction then we might think that the only way that we could be said to hear sound sources is as the result of a process of inference or association. In hearing a sound we infer that something produced it, and associate the character of the sound with a certain kind of thing, and so think: that thing (that produced this sound) is a dog.

But we might reject Berkeley's restriction. We might think that there are psychological processes akin to inference and association carried out by the auditory perceptual system; and that there is a correlation between sounds and the things that produce them such that it is plausible that the auditory system represents, in virtue of the operation of these processes, sound sources and their properties. The resulting experience might represent sounds and their sources (in much the way that Lycan (in Consciousness and Experience) has suggested that olfactory experience represents both odours and the things that produce them) in such a way as to make possible primitive demonstrative reference. I can't see that such an account would be inconsistent with phenomenal independence, or even with the claim that sounds are actually independent of their sources, for as long as there is a correlation between sounds and their sources sufficient to ground representation.

This kind of representational account can explain how demonstrative reference to sound sources is possible in a way that avoids explicit deferred ostension: it doesn't require the subject to intend to refer to the source of the sound, or to have any conception of the connection between a sound and its source. But perhaps primitive demonstrative reference requires something more.

In perceptual experience we are related to some objects in a direct way and, in virtue of being related in that way, we can think demonstratively about them. But, it might be suggested, demonstrative reference isn't really what's at issue. Talk of demonstrative reference is simply a way of indicating the kind of direct
experiential relation in question: it is that kind of direct experiential relation to an object that makes possible demonstrative thinking. Although we can pick out the relevant experiential relation by reference to demonstrative thought, the experiential relation – direct relation to an object – doesn’t consist in being in a position to think demonstratively about it. Understood this way, the claim of phenomenal intimacy is not simply the claim that we can think demonstratively about sound sources, but the claim that auditory experience relates us to sound sources in the experientially direct way that is characteristic of this kind of experiential relation. The experientially direct relation to an object is one that involves the kind of acquaintance with or consciousness of an object that John Campbell has emphasised (in *Reference and Consciousness*). Perhaps this kind of acquaintance with sound sources is what Jason has in mind when he says that auditory experience makes sound sources available for primitive demonstrative reference.

Since an account of how auditory experience represents sound sources of the kind sketched above doesn’t provide an account of how auditory experience acquaints us with sound sources, if phenomenal intimacy should be understood in terms of something like acquaintance then a representational account of this kind falls short.

Does auditory experience acquaint us with sound sources? That it does so doesn’t follow from the fact that we can think demonstratively about sound sources on the basis of auditory experience. Nor does it follow from the rejection of the claim auditory experience is a mere sign of the source. The representational alternative sketched above provides an explanation of demonstrative thought about sources in a way that avoids a commitment to sounds, or the experience of sounds, as mere signs of their sources. I think there is *something* right about the idea that our experience of sound sources is more intimate than that provided by the representational account, but more needs to be said to spell out exactly what.

Jason suggests that sounds are phenomenally bound to their sources. I’m not persuaded by his argument for this: the alleged difficulty of imagining striking a
bell and subtracting the sound. This seems to me to be not very difficult to imagine. All I need to do is imagine striking the bell with my ears plugged, or striking the bell in a vacuum. Why aren’t these cases of the event without the sound? It might be argued that these are cases of sounds existing unheard; if that’s right, it’s because it follows from our account of what sounds are and not because of what we can or can’t imagine. Can we imagine hearing the sound of a bell striking without the bell? Again, I have no difficulty with this: I imagine the sound of a bell produced in some other way – by a loudspeaker, or by a mockingbird imitating the sound, or whatever.

There are good reasons to reject phenomenal binding. As a consequence of the way the auditory system functions, we sometimes experience sounds that have been produced by two or more distinct sources. The most familiar examples of such sounds are those produced by stereo loudspeakers. In a well set up system, a sound that is in fact produced by two distinct sources – the two loudspeakers – may seem to come from a single source somewhere between the speakers. How should we describe this kind of experience? I think this is a case in which we hear a sound that appears to come from a source that doesn’t exist. Our experience of the sound is veridical, but our experience of the source is not. That seems to be a perfectly reasonable description of the situation. What stereo loudspeakers do is produce the illusion of things – musical instruments, say – spread out in front of you producing sounds, not an illusion of sounds.

If phenomenal binding is true, then my description of this kind of case must be wrong. If sounds appear to be bound to their sources then this is a case in which we appear to hear sounds bound to sources when no such sounds exist. The experience of the sound is non-veridical; it may even be that this is an experience as of a sound that doesn’t actually exist. That strikes me as not only counter-intuitive, but psychologically false. A correct understanding of the psychological function of auditory perception gives us grounds for saying that the experience of sounds in such cases is veridical, but the experience of the source of sounds is not.
One of the worries about phenomenal independence is an epistemic one. Jason suggests that it has the consequence that sound sources are hidden behind the sounds they make. But any epistemic worries here seem to me not to turn on phenomenal independence since, even if phenomenal binding is true, what we know about the source of a sound – that it is a dog barking, say – must depend on our knowledge of the character of the sound it makes. In this sense the sound source still “lies hidden behind the sound that it makes”. But is it hidden in any way that is problematic?

Consider a visual example. I know what tomatoes look like and can recognise one when I see it. The explanation of how I recognise tomatoes will appeal to their characteristic visual appearance. The visual appearance of a tomato is what it shares with anything that is visually indistinguishable from it. Since something could look just the way a tomato looks and not be a tomato the property of being a tomato is not something the contributes to its visual appearance. That doesn’t undermine the claim that I can recognise a tomato when I see it, nor does it imply that being a tomato is hidden behind its tomato-like appearance. We can construct an analogous auditory example by replacing ‘visible appearance’ with ‘acoustic appearance’: I know what dogs sound like and can recognise one when I hear it; I do so on the basis of the characteristic acoustic appearance of the sound it makes. In what sense does that mean the dog is hidden behind the sound it makes?

Of course, if sounds are in fact independent of their sources (and phenomenal binding is false) then there is a dis-analogy: whereas the explanation of how I recognise a tomato appeals to the appearance of the tomato, the explanation of how I recognise a dog appeals to the appearance of something – the sound – distinct from the dog, but how does that undermine the claim that I recognise the dog when I hear it, just as I recognise the tomato when I see it?